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Abstract
Objective—To analyze hazardous substance release surveillance data for events involving 
secondary contamination of hospital emergency departments (EDs). Secondary contamination of 
EDs may occur when a patient, exposed to a hazardous chemical, is not decontaminated before 
arrival at the ED and when ED staff is not wearing appropriate personal protective equipment. This 
can result in adverse health outcomes among department personnel, other patients, and visitors. 
Even events without actual secondary contamination risk can be real in their consequences and 
require the decontamination of the ED and/or its occupants, evacuation, or temporary ED shut-
down.
Methods—Events involving secondary contamination were identified using the Hazardous 
Substances Emergency Events Surveillance system and the National Toxic Substances Incidence 
Program during 2007–2013.
Results—Five incidents involving involved the threat of secondary contamination (0.02% of all 
events reported to the surveillance systems [n=33,001]) were detected and are described. Four 
incidents involved suspected secondary contamination in which the facility was evacuated or shut 
down.
Conclusions—These results suggest that while rare, incidents involving secondary 
contamination continue to present a hazard for emergency departments. Suggested best practices 
to avoid secondary contamination have been described. Hospitals should be made aware of the 
risks associated with secondary contamination and the need to proactively train and equip staff to 
perform decontamination.
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Introduction
Hospital emergency departments (EDs) differ from other sections of the hospital in that 
patients are brought in from the outside of the hospital and often have life-threatening 
injuries. Because ED patients frequently require rapid treatment, ED personnel must work 
quickly even without complete patient information or knowledge about the cause of the 
illness or injury. Because of this, ED personnel are at risk of injury or illness resulting from 
secondary contamination. Secondary contamination may occur when a patient is exposed at 
the scene to a chemical, radiological, or biological agent, which is then inadvertently 
transferred to attending personnel or equipment in an ED1;2. Optimally, a patient with 
chemical exposure would be fully decontaminated before arrival at an ED. However, this 
often does not occur3;4. One reason for this is that patients may be transported by private 
vehicles to the ED without being treated by the field emergency medical services (EMS) 
system2–9. On the other hand, even when transported by EMS, chemical casualties are not 
always decontaminated in the field5;10;11. Further, EMS responders may be unaware that a 
toxic exposure has occurred.
In this report, we describe five single-patient chemical emergencies involving secondary 
exposure where contamination occurred in the ED, the ED was evacuated, or it had to be 
temporarily shut down. Data for this report were obtained from the Hazardous Substances 
Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) system and the National Toxic Substance 
Incidences Program (NTSIP), which replaced HSEES in 201012. Both systems were or are 
operated by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), US 
Department of Health and Human Services.
Methods
HSEES was and NSTIP is a state-based surveillance system for acute hazardous substance 
releases12. Participating state health department personnel enter event-specific information 
into standardized data fields in a common database managed by ATSDR. Searches of 
HSEES and NTSIP data for hazardous substance releases that resulted in secondary 
contamination were performed. The search was limited to the period after 2007 because 
events involving secondary contamination in prior years have already been described13–15. 
Event records that contained the key words ‘ambulance’, ‘hospital’, ‘decon’, ‘responder’, 
‘EMS’ or ‘fire’ in the description of the event were extracted. The resulting records were 
then reviewed and events not involving ED secondary contamination were excluded.
Results
HSEES/NTSIP data include 33,001 separate events for the years 2007–2013. Of those, 5 
incidents (0.02%) involving ED secondary contamination were detected. Descriptions of 
those incidents follow.
Incident 1: Sulfuric acid
In 2009, a Texas rail yard worker succumbed to various symptoms subsequent to inhalation 
exposure to sulfuric (and possibly phosphoric) acid. Working inside a railroad tank car used 
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to transport sulfuric acid, he had been removing rust with a phosphoric acid-based product. 
The worker had used personal protective equipment (PPE) that included a self-contained 
breathing apparatus (SCBA) while inside the tank car. Upon exiting and doffing the SCBA, 
he realized he had left personal equipment inside the tank. The worker then re-entered 
without the SCBA. He immediately lost consciousness and was removed from the tank 
approximately 2–4 minutes later. The worker exhibited respiratory irritation and developed 
nausea and vomiting. EMS transported the worker to the regional medical center. It was not 
reported whether EMS alerted the medical center that a contaminated patient would be 
arriving.
Upon arrival in the ED, the worker was incoherent, had bloody emesis, and emitted a strong 
odor of sulfuric acid. After ED personnel removed his clothing and performed 
decontamination procedures, two ED nurses (who later reported detecting strong sulfuric 
acid odors) began to vomit. One of these nurses also experienced unspecified heart 
problems. Six other ED personnel also developed nausea and vomiting, eye irritation, 
unspecified respiratory symptoms, headache, dizziness or other central nervous symptoms. 
Three other ED personnel with potential exposure due to proximity to the worker did not 
develop symptoms. Data reported to ATSDR indicate Level “B” PPE (which includes SCBA 
or an air-hose supplied respirator) was worn by affected ED personnel. It was not reported 
whether ED personnel donned PPE prior to arrival of the patient. The exposure-related 
symptoms experienced by ED personnel suggests respirators were not worn properly or not 
worn during the entire time the patient was being treated or contaminated clothing was 
handled.
All affected ED personnel were decontaminated on site and then released. It was not 
reported whether the ED was closed as a result of this event. After being decontaminated, 
the rail yard worker was admitted to the hospital for additional care.
Incident 2: Methamphetamine production chemicals
In 2011, a mobile methamphetamine laboratory exploded in a busy parking lot of a 
Tennessee hospital resulting in one victim, destroying the victim’s car. The explosion 
occurred in close proximity to the hospital, and responding firefighters transported the only 
victim to the hospital’s ED without performing field decontamination. It was not reported 
whether the first responders had time to alert the ED in advance of patient arrival or if they 
had time to don appropriate PPE. While not ED personnel were injured in this event, the ED 
had to be shut down in order to be decontaminated. ED staff and the responding firefighters 
were also decontaminated. The victim of the explosion later died from severe burns.
Incident 3: Methamphetamine production chemicals
In 2011, a methamphetamine laboratory fire damaged six apartments in Tennessee. One 
victim of the fire was transported to a nearby ED via a privately-owned vehicle. At the ED, 
the victim claimed to have been burned in a gasoline explosion. Police arrived at the ED to 
investigate, linked the victim to the apartment explosion, and suggested to ED staff that the 
victim likely had been exposed to methamphetamine production chemicals. The victim was 
decontaminated with water and transported to the area burn unit. Part of the emergency room 
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was temporarily shut down for decontamination. The local fire department assisted with the 
decontamination process. Although none of 35 staff reported illness, 15 were 
decontaminated as a precaution. The hospital returned to normal operation about 45 minutes 
later.
Incident 4: Malathion
In 2013, a New York woman intentionally ingested malathion, an organophosphate 
insecticide, in her home. EMS responded, but it was not reported whether field 
decontamination of the patient was conducted or whether EMS alerted the local ED about 
the nature of the patient’s contamination. EMS then transported the patient to the ED, where 
she gave off a strong chemical odor. ED staff and patients, approximately 75 persons, were 
subsequently evacuated and a hazardous materials (Hazmat) team was called in oversee the 
situation.
Incident 5: Malathion
In 2013, a Tennessee man ingested malathion and was taken to a nearby ED where he later 
died. ED staff was unaware of what the man had ingested and quarantined his body within 
the ED. As a precaution, a portion of the ED was locked down for several hours. A local 
Hazmat team decontaminated more than a dozen ED staff. In this case, the four-hour 
decontamination did not interfere with operations. No other patients were affected.
Discussion
Events involving secondary contamination of emergency departments have been previously 
reported using surveillance data from the Hazardous Substances Emergency Events 
Surveillance (HSEES) system13. HSEES was an active, multi-state health department 
surveillance system for morbidity and mortality from acute releases of hazardous substances 
and was replaced by the National Toxic Substance Incidents Surveillance Program (NTSIP) 
in 201012. Events involving secondary contamination are rare with only 5 events, 0.02% of 
all events captured by HSEES/NTSIP between 2007 and 2013, detected. By comparison, 22 
events involving ED secondary contamination were detected in the HSEES/NTSIP systems 
during the period 1995–200613–15. Despite being rare, events involving secondary 
contamination have the potential to harm healthcare personnel and/or result in the temporary 
disruption or closure of an ED. With demand for services outpacing present ED capacity in 
the US16, even a temporary ED closure may have significant impacts on community health. 
Further, secondary contamination of an ED may be more likely during a catastrophic event 
such as a natural disaster or a terroristic act involving a release of hazardous chemical, 
biological or radiological agent, events during which a community can ill afford an ED 
closure17–19.
Several best practices for ED response to patients contaminated with chemicals have been 
advanced. The first practice is to establish hospital-based decontamination protocols and 
train response teams such that decontamination can commence within minutes of a patient’s 
arrival at the ED. That response team should be cognizant that ED staff is only likely to 
become aware of a contamination incident after affected victims arrive at the hospital 20 and 
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should be prepared to initiate a basic decontamination without full knowledge of identity of 
the contaminant. Cibulsky et al. note that there is no consensus in the literature regarding a 
best method to assess a patient’s decontamination needs21. However, Cibulsky et al. provide 
the following guidance for assessing the need to decontaminate a patient:
• Signs and symptoms of exposure displayed by patients;
• Visible evidence of contamination on the patient’s skin or clothing;
• Proximity of the patient to the location of the release;
• Contamination detected on the patient using appropriate detection technology;
• The chemical identity (if known) or physical state, characteristics, and behavior 
(if unknown);
• Request by the patient for decontamination, even if contamination is unlikely.21
While it is preferable to decontaminate patients before they are transported from the scene, 
this does not always occur and every ED must be prepared to carry out this task. Basic 
chemical decontamination, dating back to at least World War II, involves removing the 
patient’s clothing and rinsing him/her with water 22. Improving on this generic 
decontamination method, another best practice is to train ED personnel how to quickly 
access information on decontamination procedures for patients exposed to common 
chemicals using readily available tools, such as the Wireless Information System for 
Emergency Responders (WISER; http://wiser.nlm.nih.gov/). Permanent hospital 
decontamination facilities are regarded as preferable to temporary ones because they can be 
activated more quickly and generally provide more protection during adverse weather23. A 
decontamination area that is well-ventilated and with a ventilation system independent from 
the hospital is best able to prevent cross-contamination23. When this is not possible, 
decontamination may have to be performed outside of the ED to prevent the contamination 
of it and the patients within24. In such a case, a source of warm water and protection from 
the elements should be assured. While ED personnel are less likely to experience the same 
exposure levels as responders at the site of a chemical release 25, the training the 
decontamination team in the selection and use of appropriate PPE would be beneficial. 
Finally, to develop and maintain competency, the decontamination team should undergo 
regular refresher training and drills26. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) has documented mandatory requirements and best practices for ED management of 
casualties exposed to hazardous substances23. Hospitals may also consider developing 
response practices in the context of Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs)27 and 
Healthcare Coalitions28. These collaborative groups may be able to provide hospitals with 
likely incident scenarios, especially in communities with fixed facilities, such as industrial 
plants or transportation hubs. Conducting incident surveillance, as done with HSEES and 
NTSIP, allows for evidence-based planning.
It is unclear how many of the above best practices were implemented in the cases presented 
here. In incident #1, although it is unknown whether the ED was alerted that the patient was 
contaminated with sulfuric acid vapor, ED staff apparently deployed with appropriate PPE. 
Ideally, the patient would have had his clothing removed and stored in chemically-resistant 
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vapor proof sealed containers for later disposal. The ED staff performing the 
decontamination would have optimally donned PPE prior to contact with the patient, 
decontaminated the patient, passed the patient into the ED, undergone decontamination 
themselves, then doffed their PPE. Incident #3 illustrates how ED staff may be forced to 
operate with incomplete (or misleading) information, when patients are not transported to 
the ED via EMS. The incidents involving malathion highlight, once again, that victims may 
be admitted to an ED without apparent need for decontamination, but still have potential to 
contaminate the ED via their vomit29.
Conclusions
It is encouraging that few events involving ED secondary contamination were detected by 
the HSEES/NTSIP system. However, the cases presented here demonstrate secondary 
contamination continues to be a risk to emergency departments. This is particularly the case 
when, as so often happens, patients arrive, unannounced by private car or other non-
ambulance vehicles. Making hospitals aware of the risks associated with secondary 
contamination and the benefits of proactively training and equipping staff to perform 
decontamination may reduce the risk of secondary contamination. For situations in which 
ED secondary contamination occurs despite the implementation of relevant protocols, 
investigations into these types of occurrences could be conducted to prevent future incidents.
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